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Central Bank Mandates, Sustainability Objectives 






This paper examines the extent to which addressing climate-related risks and 
supporting sustainable finance fit into the current set of central bank mandates and 
objectives. To this end, we conduct a detailed analysis of central bank mandates and 
objectives, using the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database, and compare these to 
current arrangements and sustainability-related policies central banks have adopted 
in practice. To scrutinise the alignment of mandates with climate-related policies, we 
differentiate between the impact of environmental factors on the conventional core 
objectives of central banking and a potential supportive role of central banks with 
regard to green finance and sustainability. Of the 135 central banks in our sample, 
only 12% have explicit sustainability mandates, while another 40% are mandated to 
support the government’s policy priorities, which in most cases include sustainability 
goals. However, given that climate risks can directly affect central banks’ traditional 
core responsibilities, most notably monetary and financial stability, even central banks 
without explicit or implicit sustainability objectives ought to incorporate climate-related 
physical and transition risks into their core policy implementation frameworks in order 
to efficiently and successfully safeguard macro-financial stability. 
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1. Introduction 
Against the backdrop of increasing public awareness of the risks posed by climate 
change and the political commitment of the international community to address these 
challenges as embodied in the Paris Agreement, recent years have seen an 
intensifying discussion on the role of central banks in addressing risks associated with 
climate change and in supporting the development of green finance (e.g., Volz et al. 
2015; Batten et al. 2016; Volz 2017; Campiglio et al. 2018; Dikau and Volz 2019). This 
has not been a purely theoretical debate. A growing number of central banks have 
already adopted green finance policies or guidelines, or have started to incorporate 
climate risk into macroprudential frameworks (McDaniels and Robins 2018). This has 
led to the launch of initiatives such as the Sustainable Banking Network (SBN) and 
the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System 
(NGFS). 
While a general consensus has developed that central banks (and other supervisory 
bodies) cannot ignore climate change (NGFS 2018, 2019), there is no agreement on 
the extent to which climate change (or other environmental risks) should be 
incorporated into existing operational frameworks or whether central banks should 
even play a supportive or promotional role in scaling up green finance. This may not 
be surprising, given the different histories and policy traditions of central banks in 
different parts of the world and also given the differences in their mandates. 
Historically, the role of central banks has evolved considerably, and changes have 
often occurred in response to crises or perpetual policy problems. For example, the 
Financial Crisis of 2008/2009 illustrated the implications of the omission of financial 
stability objectives in most central bank mandates. The crisis triggered a change in the 
broader environment in which central banks are now operating and thereby also 
necessitated a further evolution of the role, governance and mandate of these 
institutions (BIS 2009). The financial crisis has raised concerns with regard to the role 
and ability of central banks in preventing and managing financial crises and provoked 
a discussion of the role of central banks in safeguarding financial stability and, 
eventually, the recognition of the need to reconsider or adjust the mandates of central 
banks with regard to financial stability (BIS 2011). 
The impending climate crisis, which will have a potentially disastrous impact on our 
economies and requires urgent policy action (IPCC 2018), is once again changing the 
policy environment in which central banks are operating. Climate change has possibly 
significant implications not only for the core operations of central banks but also poses 
the question of their broader role in addressing climate change-related risk and 
mitigation. How far central banks can go in playing a role as an overall catalyst for 
mainstreaming green finance on the one hand, and incorporating climate risks in their 
core policy frameworks on the other hand, depends significantly on their mandates. A 
close investigation of the legal objectives of central banks is therefore essential in 
order to substantiate the on-going discussion against the background of the 
increasingly pressing issue of responding to global warming. 
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This paper seeks to contribute to the broader discussion of the implications of climate 
change for the operations, governance and role of central banks. It is not the aim of 
this paper to set out a one-size-fits-all approach regarding how central banks can 
become “greener”, but rather to contribute to the fundamental understanding of how 
climate change relates to the operational frameworks of monetary authorities. It is a 
first attempt at analysing to what extent climate-related risks and mitigation policies fit 
into the current set of central bank mandates and objectives. To this end, we conduct 
a detailed analysis of central bank mandates and objectives, using the IMF’s Central 
Bank Legislation Database, and compare these to current arrangements and 
sustainability responsibilities that central banks have adopted in practice. To scrutinise 
the alignment of mandates with climate-related policies, we differentiate between the 
impact of environmental factors on the conventional core objectives of central banking, 
and a potential promotional role of central banks with regard to green finance and 
sustainability. Furthermore, we review the potential risks and trade-offs involved when 
central banks act as catalyst for greening the financial system. 
Our analysis of 135 central bank mandates shows that only few central banks – 12% 
of our sample – operate under a mandate that explicitly includes the promotion of 
sustainable growth or development as an objective, but another 40% are tasked to 
support their governments’ national policy objectives (often conditioned on not 
interfering with achieving their primary objective, which usually includes price stability). 
However, in the ensuing theoretical analysis, we dissect how climate risks may directly 
impact on traditional core responsibilities of central banks, most notably monetary and 
financial stability. The implication is that most central banks will have to incorporate 
climate- and mitigation-risks into their core policy implementation frameworks in order 
to efficiently and successfully safeguard price and financial stability, even if their 
mandates make no explicit reference to sustainability. A potential role of central banks 
in promoting sustainability in the financial system and “greening” the economy is more 
contentious, not least because of the possibility of distorting effects that direct 
interventions into the market aimed at “greening” the economy might have, but also 
due to potential conflicts with the central banks’ primary goals. It therefore is essential 
that a potential supporting role of central banks is covered by their mandates. As 
mentioned, numerous central banks are already mandated to support national policy 
objectives. To the extent that the government’s policy objectives include climate 
change mitigation or adaptation, a change of mandate for these central banks to 
further support the mainstreaming of the financial system would not be required. 
However, for roughly half of the central banks in our sample, such a promotional role 
is not covered by their mandate. Whether this should change is ultimately a political 
decision, which should be made on the basis of a careful assessment of the potential 
risks involved. However, in a world where the impacts of climate change become ever 
larger, and climate change calls into question the long-term ability of central banks to 
maintain financial stability and asset quality if warming goes beyond key thresholds, 
the cost of not engaging the central bank in the promotion of sustainable finance may 
become prohibitively high. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 empirically investigates the mandates of 
central banks with regard to general sustainability objectives or objectives securing 
the central bank’s support for national policy priorities. These objectives are compared 
to the actual “green” activities central banks have started to adopt in practice. 
Subsequently, Section 3 discusses the extent to which incorporating climate risks and 
scaling up green finance is covered by central bank mandates. It differentiates 
between the impact of environmental factors on the conventional core objectives of 
central banking, and a potential promotional role of central banks with regard to green 
finance and sustainability. Section 4 reviews the potential risks and trade-offs involved 
when central banks act as catalyst for greening the financial system. Section 5 
summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Central Bank Mandates and Sustainable Central Banking in Practice 
We conduct an empirical examination of current central bank mandates to investigate 
the extent to which central banks are equipped with objectives that task them to 
enhance sustainability and mainstream green finance. To this end, we examine the 
IMF Central Bank Legislation Database (Section 2.02, Objectives of the Central Bank, 
April 2017 version), which comprises 126 institutions, four of which are the central 
banks of monetary unions. To this we add nine central banks that are not part of the 
original database but have adopted green finance policies.3 The results of our 
investigation of a total of 135 central bank mandates provide a starting point for the 
ensuing discussion of whether it is necessary for central banks to further incorporate 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria into their core activities in Section 
3. 
Table 1 summarises the results of the investigation of the mandates of 135 central 
banks with regard to whether they are assigned with objectives that would cover an 
active promotion or mainstreaming of green finance. The table lists the 70 central 
banks and monetary unions with a mandate assigning them an objective to either (1) 
enhance, promote or support “sustainability” or “sustainable development/growth”, or 
(2) support the government’s economic objectives or policy goals. Central banks with 
this second objective are included here because governments’ economic policy goals 
may comprise sustainability. The case of the Bank of England, discussed in more 
detail below, serves as a good example because its mandate comprises support for 
the government’s economic policy, which includes sustainable growth. Central banks 
with an objective to promote “sustained” growth or development are not considered to 
have a sustainability-enhancing mandate and are therefore not included in the table. 
Table 1 lists the parts of the mandates under which the institutions are assigned the 
aforementioned objectives and contrast the results with the actual “green” activities of 
central banks to date, as well as with the central banks’ choice of monetary policy 
framework. 
                                            
3 These are the central banks of Singapore, Australia, Bangladesh, India, Lebanon, Mongolia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and Samoa. 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
An initial result is that out of 135 investigated mandates, 70 central banks and 
monetary unions are equipped with a mandate to either directly or indirectly, through 
the government’s policy objective, enhance the sustainability of economic growth or 
sustainability in general (Figure 1). The mandates of 65 central banks and monetary 
unions on the other hand, include neither a direct nor indirect sustainability objective. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Of the 70 central banks and monetary unions with a potential sustainability objective, 
the central banks of 15 countries (Czech Republic, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Iraq, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Ukraine and Zimbabwe), as well as one monetary union (West African 
Monetary Union, WAMU) are charged with mandates that include an explicit objective 
for the promotion or support of “sustainable” economic growth or development (Figure 
2). In almost all cases, the pursuit of this promotional sustainability objective is subject 
to achieving the core objective of price stability. The other 54 central banks are 
mandated with the objective of supporting the government’s policy priorities. This 
objective is in almost all cases subject to not impeding the central bank’s ability to 
pursue the primary objective, which usually is price stability. The analysis also shows 
that a large proportion of central banks with direct or indirect sustainability mandates 
are in emerging market and developing country economies, where mandates have 
traditionally not only been broader, but in part also included explicit “promotional” 
objectives (Dafe and Volz 2015). With regard to monetary policy frameworks, Table 1 
shows that there is no strong correlation between the inclusion of a direct or indirect 
sustainability mandate in a central bank’s mandate and its choice of policy framework. 
Of the 70 central banks of our sample with a direct or potentially implicit sustainability 
mandate, 20 are operating under an inflation targeting framework, 19 rely on an 
exchange rate anchor, six target monetary aggregates, and the frameworks of 25 are 
classified by the IMF (2018) as “other”, including the national central banks of all 19 
member countries of the Eurozone as well as the European Central Bank (ECB). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
While just 12% of the investigated central banks have explicit sustainability mandates 
and 54 (or 40%) are mandated to support the government’s policy priorities and hence 
potentially sustainability, 48% of those investigated have no direct or indirect mandate 
ensuring the central bank’s engagement with climate change-related topics. However, 
there are numerous central banks whose mandates do not mention sustainability or 
support of government policy (which are therefore not listed in Table 1) that 
nevertheless have begun to address climate change-related risks and sustainability 
challenges. These are listed in Table 2, which first presents the green activities of the 
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respective central bank, followed by their mandated core objectives and monetary 
policy framework. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Most of the “green” central banking activities listed in Tables 1 and 2 appear to be 
aimed at incorporating climate change-related risks into the financial system, as well 
as mainstreaming and pricing-in more general ESG risks into the activities of financial 
institutions by providing them with tools, knowledge and adequate green guidelines. 
Furthermore, most of these policies appear to aim at enhancing the efficiency of 
central banks’ core objective (mostly price or financial stability) policy implementation 
frameworks by allowing central banks to operate in financial systems that increasingly 
incorporate climate risks and price-in ESG criteria. Figure 3 provides an overview of 
the adoption of different types of “green” activities by central banks over time. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Importantly, Table 2 shows that 25 central banks address climate change-related and 
other ESG risks even in the absence of explicit sustainability mandates. For instance, 
not all central banks that have joined the NGFS have an explicit or potentially implicit 
sustainability objective in their mandate. However, all central banks that are members 
of the NGFS have explicitly accepted climate change as a source of financial risk and 
have hence concluded that ensuring the financial system’s resilience towards these 
risks lies within the mandates of central banks and financial supervisors (NGFS 2018, 
2019). This highlights an important point – central banking activities depend in practice 
not only on the formal mandate but also its interpretation, which can be ambiguous. In 
the following, we illustrate the interpretation of mandates relating to climate risk and 
sustainability for three cases, namely the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), 
the Bank of England, and the Dutch central bank. 
In the case of the Eurozone, Article 127 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union clearly defines price stability as the primary objective of the ESCB. 
However, it also states that “[w]ithout prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 
of the Treaty on European Union.” Article 3 (3) of the Treaty on European Union in 
turn includes the objective of “sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment” (emphasis added). This means that 
the ESCB’s mandate does indeed include, inter alia and without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, supporting the European Union’s environmental objectives 
(Volz 2017). This gives rise to the question of the extent to which the political 
authorities and the public at large want the ESCB to play an active role in supporting 
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environmental objectives. As the current discussions in the Eurozone show, it is not 
solely up to the central bank to interpret its mandate – ultimately, central bank policies 
need to be based on public and political support. 
Recent research has begun to explore the Eurozone’s ability to promote 
environmental protection in more detail (Solana 2019) and, in particular, the policy 
space created by the ECB’s mandate for green monetary policy (Fischer 2018). Benoît 
Cœuré, at the time a Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, also addressed the 
underlying question of whether environmental issues are part of the ECB’s mandate, 
arguing that while the Treaty mandates the protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment, it also opens up the question of “why the ECB should not promote 
industries that promise the strongest employment growth, irrespective of their 
ecological footprint” (Cœuré 2018), thereby pointing to potentially conflicting 
objectives outside of the ECB’s core functions. On the issue of how climate change 
affects the conduct of monetary policy, Cœuré (2018) reasons that it may “complicate 
the correct identification of shocks relevant for the medium-term inflation outlook, […] 
increase the likelihood of extreme events and hence erode central banks’ conventional 
policy space more often, and […] raise the number of occasions on which central 
banks face a trade-off forcing them to prioritise stable prices over output” (Cœuré 
2018).4 However, Cœuré argues that generally, “there is scope for central banks 
themselves to play a supporting role in mitigating the risks associated with climate 
change while staying within [their] mandate” (ibid.). Furthermore, with regard to the 
threat of material climate-related risks, the ECB states that while it does not see that 
these risks pose a threat for financial stability in the euro area in the short-term, banks 
may be indirectly but substantially affected by “more frequent and severe extreme 
weather events or by the ongoing transition to a low-carbon economy” (ECB 2018: 5). 
The Bank of England is an example of a central bank whose mandate has no explicit 
references to sustainability and has been accused of over-stepping its mandate by 
addressing challenges posed by climate change. The Bank of England’s pro-active 
stance towards addressing climate-risks has been condemned by some as being part 
of the Bank’s “mission creep” of offering warnings on topics some consider too political 
for the institution (Binham and Crow 2018, Crow and Binham 2018). However, the 
Bank’s mandate obliges it to support the government’s economic policy and objectives 
for growth, which are set out in HM Treasury’s Annual Remit for the Monetary Policy 
Committee. For instance, HM Treasury (2018) explicitly and repeatedly sets out 
“sustainable and balanced growth” as the government’s economic policy objective. It 
could therefore be argued that the Bank is thereby also furnished with a(n) (indirect) 
sustainability objective through supporting the government’s sustainable economic 
growth policy. Bank of England Governor Carney strongly maintains that the Bank 
                                            
4 Similarly, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann (2019) has acknowledged that “[t]he importance of 
climate change and climate policy for central banks is not confined to our role as financial supervisors 
and guardians of financial stability, though. There can be all manner of monetary policy implications, 
too. Both climate change and climate policy can have a bearing on macroeconomic indicators such as 
output and inflation.” 
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considers it a central part of its responsibility to identify, warn against and mitigate any 
kind of threat to financial stability, including those from climate change-related risks; 
Carney “bristled at suggestions he was overstepping the mark by asking banks to do 
more to model climate risks, from the impact of floods on their mortgage books to 
whether new green policies could hurt the creditworthiness of their corporate clients” 
(Crow and Binham 2018). With regard to the Bank’s approach to mitigating climate 
risks or greening the financial system, Carney has voiced his distaste for a 
“surreptitious” approach or implicit guidance through central bank soft power and 
“against lowering capital requirements for a bank if they invest in a green project per 
se” (ibid.). Instead, Carney expressed support for explicit climate change-related 
regulation or carbon pricing.5 Regarding a “promotional” role in enhancing green 
climate policy, Carney points to the limits of the mandated role of central banks, which, 
he maintains, cannot “substitute for governments in climate policy” (Crow and Binham 
2018), a view that he shares with virtually all central bankers. 
The case of the De Nederlandsche Bank’s (DNB) mandate and objectives offers 
further insights into the complexity of assessing a central bank’s “green” role based 
on its legal objectives. As part of the ESCB, the DNB’s objectives and tasks are 
determined by the same provisions of the Treaty that determine the mandates of all 
national EU central banks, namely, price stability, support for the general economic 
policies in the EU and to act in accordance with open market principles (DNB Bank 
Act 1998, section 2). Despite the absence of “sustainability” from its statutory act, 
today the DNB is widely credited for having formally integrated sustainability into its 
operational framework. This was due to the deliberate decision in 2011 by the then 
newly-appointed board of the DNB to update the central bank’s mission statement 
(Knot 2018). Against the background of the Financial Crisis of 2008, financial stability 
was considered by the DNB’s board to be a necessary central pillar of its mission 
statement in order to differentiate the new approach from the pre-Crisis one, the latter 
of which had proved to create “prosperity [that] had turned out not to be sustainable” 
(ibid.). Hence, since 2011, the DNB’s mission statement, both as a central bank and 
financial supervisor, requires the DNB “to safeguard financial stability and thus 
contribute to sustainable prosperity in the Netherlands” (ibid.). However, at the time, 
the term “sustainability” did not necessarily have the same connotation that it has 
today with regard to climate change and greening of financial systems (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, this has led the DNB to incorporate sustainability considerations into 
most of its core operations, including in economic research (ibid.). Furthermore, the 
DNB recognises the necessity to contribute to sustainable development (Knot 2015). 
While the DNB is careful to emphasise that “as a central bank and supervisor, we must 
not overstretch our mandate”, it does consider ways to “impact investment decisions 
and credit allocation” and help “transform the financial infrastructure” to take into 
                                            
5 Governor Mark Carney compared the Bank of England’s plan to stress test the balance sheets of the 
largest UK banks against potential threats from climate change in order to assess the adequacy of 
capital to hold off a shock with “the traditional “eyebrow raise” governors would use to signal their 
displeasure at certain banking activity in the past” (Binham and Crow 2018). 
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account the transition to a low carbon economy to fall under its mission of 
“safeguarding sustainable prosperity” (Elderson 2018). 
 
3. Central Banking and Climate Change – Theoretical Considerations6 
The analysis above has not only shown significant differences in central banks’ 
mandates, it has also revealed large differences in practice in how central banks have 
started to address climate change-related concerns. Against this background, this 
section first considers how climate risks and their mitigation relate to central bank 
mandates and how these new challenges and potential responsibilities fit into 
conventional policy frameworks and affect the traditional core responsibilities of 
central banks. It subsequently discusses the second, more contentious dimension of 
green central banking – i.e., an active contribution to a greening of the financial system 
and the economy as a whole by central banks. The distinction between core and 
promotional objectives in central bank mandates also relates to a recognition of the 
different time horizon of objectives, as well as to the broad differences between 
advanced, and developing and emerging economies. In the latter, central bank 
mandates have more commonly tended to include promotional objectives. 
 
3.1 Central Banks’ Core Objectives and Climate Change 
A first question concerns the mandated objectives and governance arrangements 
required for the effective conduct of core monetary policy functions given the risks and 
policy challenges posed by climate change. The core responsibility of most central 
banks – often specified in the mandate as the singular or primary objective of monetary 
policy – is safeguarding low and stable inflation. Sometimes embedded in an inflation-
targeting framework, this primary focus of central banks on price stability is based on 
the strong empirical evidence that in the short-run, high inflation (and high volatility) 
distort the decision-making process with regard to savings, investment and production 
and hence slows economic growth (Fischer 1993). Low and stable inflation is therefore 
understood to be a necessary precondition for growth or development to take place. 
Apart from maintaining low and stable inflation, safeguarding financial stability has 
traditionally been the other important concern for central banks, which have historically 
acted as lender of last resort. Although there was a trend since the 1990s to assign 
responsibility for financial stability to dedicated financial supervisory authorities, it has 
received renewed attention as a crucial central banking objective against the 
background of the Global Financial Crisis. As discussed, a further (often secondary) 
goal of central banking is supporting wider economic policy objectives such as 
sustainable growth or, in some cases, maximum employment. A strong argument for 
central banks to take environmental factors into account in the conduct of monetary 
policy in the pursuit of their core objectives can be derived from how these central 
goals are affected by climate change and other environmental risks. 
                                            
6 This section builds on Dikau and Volz (2019). 
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Prices and price variability, which are at the centre of attention of most central banks, 
could be affected through various channels by anthropogenic climate change and an 
associated increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. To start 
with, climate change may have a significant impact on agricultural production, both 
domestic and abroad, and hence on food prices, which are an important component 
of consumer price inflation. For instance, climate change-related droughts and floods 
may have a significant impact on agricultural output and cause supply shocks and 
hence rising prices and cost-push inflation. For economies in which agricultural 
production is a central pillar of the economy – which is often the case in developing 
economies – climate change effects on the agricultural sector may also have a broader 
impact on aggregate income and employment. More broadly, climate change can lead 
to supply-side shocks that may cause a trade-off for central banks between stabilising 
inflation and stabilising output fluctuations (Cœuré 2018). For instance, natural 
hazards may destroy production capacity, while extreme temperatures may lead to 
productivity shocks. These can cause pressure on both input and output prices. 
While a first concern is how climate change-related hazards may directly affect prices, 
a second issue of concern is the potential impact of climate change mitigation policy 
on inflation. An important issue in this context is the potential impact that climate 
change mitigation policies may have on energy production and prices (Volz 2017). 
McKibbin et al. (2017) discuss how different climate change policy regimes – carbon 
policies such as a carbon tax, a permit trading system, and other regulatory measures 
– could theoretically affect different monetary policy regimes. In a scenario where the 
introduction of a carbon tax causes aggregate output to decline and inflation to spike, 
no response by the central bank would yield a permanently lower output level and no 
change in the long-term growth rate. In the case of a strict inflation-targeting regime, 
the central bank would respond to the spike in inflation by raising interest rates, 
thereby further slowing the economy, but also causing exchange rate appreciation. 
While both would have a depreciating effect on inflation, the overall decline in output 
would be worse than in the case without central bank intervention. McKibbin et al. also 
discuss implications for other monetary policy regimes, including flexible-inflation 
targeting and price-level targeting, and come to the overall conclusion that solely 
responding to the inflationary component, without taking rising prices and decreasing 
output resulting from climate policy into account, may lead to unnecessarily large 
output losses. Monetary policy therefore has to consider climate-related effects on 
food or energy prices, as well as the impact of climate change mitigation policies 
because of potentially important implications for core inflation. 
A further major concern relates to potential impacts of climate change on financial 
stability. Given that climate-related risks are non-linear, tipping points could 
exacerbate the climate crisis and lead to a drastic reassessment of risk, leading to a 
“climate Minsky moment” (Carney 2016) that could wreak havoc in financial markets. 
To the extent that environmental damages and climate-related risks affect the stability 
of banks, insurance firms and other financial actors, they need to be of concern for 
central banking. Thus far, only a few central banks and financial supervisors have 
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been concerned with environmental risk, and even fewer have considered it as part of 
their systemic risk framework, even though risks arising from climate change can 
constitute a significant systemic risk for the financial sector and economies at large 
(Volz 2017). However, a broad consensus is emerging that climate change and related 
mitigation policies will have substantial repercussions on the functioning of economies 
and hence, financial systems (Bank of England 2015; Carney 2015, Monnin 2018, 
NGFS 2019). 
Three different types of risk through which climate change may affect financial systems 
have been identified: transitional risk, physical risk, and liability risk (Carney 2015). 
Transitional risk describes the uncertainty associated with policy, price, and valuation 
changes that may occur in the process of mitigating climate change and reducing 
carbon emissions. International goals, such as limiting global warming to two degrees, 
will require powerful policy initiatives, such as the introduction of carbon taxes or 
extensive environmental regulation, which will affect the valuation of carbon-intensive 
businesses and may render assets of coal, gas, and oil companies less valuable with 
potential systemic repercussions in case these policy changes have not been priced-
in. Volz (2017) also discusses the development of new technologies in the process of 
climate change mitigation that may render existing technologies redundant, and the 
associated revaluation of assets, as a potential source of financial instability, which, if 
they do not occur in a gradual manner, may have systemic implications. 
Physical risk describes the risk of natural hazards, such as floods and storms, which 
may cause direct damages to an economy, as well as indirectly through the disruption 
of international production and supply chains. Climate-related damages and risks are 
understood to be potentially significant and to not only cause disruptions for individual 
firms or sectors, but also have systemic repercussions for the economy and therefore, 
financial stability. Increasing levels of physical risk can be expected to have particularly 
large repercussions for the insurance sector. As recognized by the Bank of England 
(2015), climate change-induced and other vital environmental changes therefore have 
clear implications for central banks because they may negatively affect the stability of 
financial institutions and systems. Climate vulnerability may also have significant 
impact on the fiscal position and debt sustainability (Kling et al. 2018). Pricing-in 
physical risks is an essential step in avoiding these negative repercussions for the 
economy and seems especially crucial for the valuation of long-term investments. 
Thirdly, liability risk describes climate or environmental risks that occur due to 
uncertainty surrounding potential financial losses and compensation claims stemming 
from damages caused by climate change-related natural hazards (Bank of England 
2015; Carney 2015). For instance, agents may seek compensation for financial 
damages from carbon extractors or emitters and environmental polluters, creating 
repercussions for the insurance sector that provides third-party liability insurance, 
which in turn has implications for financial regulators, such as central banks (Bank of 
England 2015). 
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An important aspect of the role of central banks in addressing climate risks relates to 
the time inconsistency problem. Unlike governments, central banks are well positioned 
to solve time inconsistency problems by committing to medium term policies, usually 
low and stable inflation, that would allow for a maximum of sustainable growth. Given 
the nature of climate change, the sustainability agenda is extending time horizons for 
economic policies, which essentially implies that policy makers ought to maximise the 
sustainable growth rate not just over a business or credit cycle, but over (at least) a 
generation (Fisher and Alexander 2019). Central banks are uniquely placed to address 
the time inconsistency problem. Of course, it will be crucial not to lose focus on 
monetary and financial stability – which are indeed necessary pre-requisites for long-
term sustainability policies. 
Overall, a consensus has been emerging in the central banking community that both 
physical and transition risk can impact on macroeconomic stability and create and 
intensify risks to the stability of the financial system, and that potential disruptions from 
climate change ought to be analysed and different climate scenarios need to be 
considered by central banks, especially if central banks are responsible for 
safeguarding financial stability (Bank of England 2015; Carney 2015; NGFS 2018). 
 
3.2 “Promotional” Objectives 
The second dimension of green central banking – an active contribution to a greening 
of the financial system and the economy as a whole – has been more contentious. 
Promotional objectives generally address long-term targets for central banks, such as 
economic development or growth, the promotion of sustainability and, theoretically, 
also the greening of the economy or climate change mitigation. First coined by Keynes 
(1913) in the context of central banking in a developing country context, promotional 
objectives have historically usually only explicitly been stated in the statutes of central 
banks in developing and emerging economies, while remaining absent from those of 
advanced economies’ central banks, where, at most, promotional objectives were 
informally and implicitly conveyed. 
Theoretically, central banks have numerous powerful tools at their disposal to affect 
credit allocation and the investment behaviour of financial firms.7 Whether and to what 
extent a central bank should use its powers and actively engage in “greening” the 
financial system and the economy depends on two factors: its legal mandate, and the 
extent to which it is best placed to correct certain types of market failures, considering 
the ability and suitability of other policy institutions to steer the green transformation 
(Volz 2017). 
For central banks to assume an active “greening” role, an explicit legal mandate is 
required to pursue environmental and sustainability objectives, given the potentially 
distributive consequences. As discussed in Section 2, central banks in most of today’s 
advanced economies have a relatively narrow mandate with the primary objective of 
                                            
7 For an overview, see Volz (2017) and Dikau and Volz (2019). 
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pursuing price stability and, in some cases, financial stability. As discussed, such 
narrow mandates arguably require central banks to explore climate and environmental 
risks with regard to these core goals, but they do not mandate them to go further and 
to actively promote sustainability and green finance. In developing and emerging 
economies, central bank mandates are often more comprehensive and include social 
and economic objectives (and sometimes sustainability). This is reflected by the fact 
that central banks in many developing and emerging economies have been 
comparatively more active in promoting green finance and sustainable development, 
as discussed above. In specific circumstances, there may indeed be good reasons for 
why central banks should be mandated to play a promotional role with regard to green 
finance and sustainability (if they aren’t already). We will discuss these reasons in the 
following section, before turning to potential risks and trade-offs in Section 4. 
Achieving the global climate targets will not only require the financial sector to play a 
central role in financing sustainable and green investment, but also to curb funding 
away from environmentally harmful activities. In the absence of public intervention, 
banks and other financial institutions may allocate their resources to environmentally 
and socially undesirable activities, such as carbon-intensive or polluting ventures in 
order to maximize their private returns. This discrepancy between environmental and 
social returns, and private returns represents a market failure or imperfection that may 
call for efficiency-enhancing government intervention. That free markets do not 
necessarily yield Pareto-efficient allocations has been investigated by Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1986), based on the understanding that if information is incomplete or 
asymmetric, or when markets are incomplete, outcomes may not be efficient and can 
be improved through government intervention. With regard to the allocation of credit, 
Stiglitz (1994) discusses an efficiency-enhancing role of credit policies based on the 
assumption that the private returns of commercial bank lending are not necessarily 
congruent with social returns. Stiglitz argues that in order to overcome these 
discrepancies between private and social return, directed credit, restricted lending to 
some activities, and promoting investment in others may be justified. With regard to 
sustainable growth and green finance, externalities that cause an environmentally 
suboptimal allocation of credit by commercial banks and other market participants may 
call for a more active, market-correcting role of central banks. Nonetheless, 
intervention by the central bank conceptually constitutes a second-best solution to the 
problem of market imperfection. The preferable first-best solution would be the 
removal of the market failure. For instance, a carbon-pricing mechanism that 
internalizes the social costs of carbon emissions would constitute a preferred, first-
best, market failure-correcting policy that may prevent or dis-incentivize 
environmentally undesirable investment; the problem, however, is that such first-best 
policies may not always be politically feasible or may take a long time to establish 
(Volz 2017). In the case where the optimality conditions of fixing market failure cannot 
be satisfied, the intervention of the central bank through environmental financial 
regulation or the interference into the allocation of resources can be interpreted as a 
second-best solution based on the theory of the second-best by Lipsey and Lancaster 
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(1956) (Volz 2017). In practice, second-best policies could be implemented by 
mandating central banks to address such externalities by affecting the creation and 
allocation of credit. 
Central banks and other financial regulatory authorities can influence investment 
decisions and the allocation of resources and credit through a number of different 
policy implementation instruments. Their regulatory oversight over money, credit, and 
the financial system puts central banks in a uniquely powerful position that enables 
them to incentivize or direct resources away from carbon-intensive sectors and 
towards green investment. Especially in developing countries, central banks typically 
have a strong institutional standing that enables them to shape policy outcomes in 
ways that other public institutions, such as environmental ministries, are unlikely to 
achieve. However, given their enormous powers, it is crucial to consider the limits to 
central banks’ mandates and honour the need for accountability to the public. 
Historically, credit allocation policies and various other instruments of “financial 
repression” were widely used, and in many cases, led to substantial distortions of 
financial systems with often unwanted repercussions for savings and prices; in these 
cases, the consequence often was the underdevelopment of financial markets. While 
the historic success or failure of credit allocation and financial repression policies is 
subject to on-going debate, such instruments stand in strong contrast to the widely 
accepted notion of the neutrality of monetary policy and central banks in general 
towards different investment classes, sectors, or types of firms. Allocating financial 
resources towards or away from certain sectors and companies implies favouring 
certain segments of the economy over others and appears to be incompatible with the 
modern understanding of independent central banks. Nonetheless, many central 
banks in emerging and developing economies have resorted to these policies as 
viable, second-best solutions to promote sustainable development and green 
investment. The notion of the neutrality of monetary policy has come under intense 
scrutiny more recently (e.g., Gornemann 2016, Coibion et al. 2017, Matikainen et al. 
2017), not least in the context of discussions about the distributional consequences of 
the negative interest and quantitative easing policies adopted by major central banks. 
Another kind of market failure involves missing or incomplete financial markets that 
impede the trading of different forms of credit, assets, or risks (Volz 2017). While 
central banks most certainly have a role to play in financial market development and 
in establishing primary and secondary markets for securities, as well as money and 
exchange markets where none exist (Gray and Talbot 2007), they may also be in a 
position to aid the development of new green market segments. For example, central 
banks can contribute to creating a regulatory environment that promotes green bonds 
issuances and trading in secondary markets. 
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4. Risks and Trade-offs 
While the paper has thus far argued that there may be a case for a pro-active, 
“sustainable development role” of central banks, one needs to be clear about the risks 
of overstretching central banks’ mandates. Two risks are particularly important. 
First, on a functional level, central banks will encounter problems if they are supposed 
to achieve too many objectives and have too few tools – this is the so-called Tinbergen 
rule (Volz 2017). In principle, if central banks were tasked with environmental goals, 
they would need to be equipped with effective instruments in order to achieve these 
goals without compromising other goals. It should be noted though that the financial 
and macroeconomic risk challenges stemming from climate change discussed above 
are issues central banks have to deal with in any case. That is, as far as the traditional 
core responsibilities of central banks – safeguarding macroeconomic and financial 
stability – are affected, there is no need to add environmental goals to central banks’ 
mandates, as these are implicitly already part of their mandate. Yet, it will be critical to 
analyse in detail how environmental and climate change risks can be adequately 
incorporated into existing frameworks. Recent years have seen considerable efforts 
by central banks and academics to develop macroprudential frameworks and 
instruments (e.g., Mendoza 2016; Battiston et al. 2017). The understanding of how to 
best incorporate climate risk into macroprudential analysis is still at an early stage, but 
a consensus is clearly emerging that climate and environmental risks need to be 
addressed in financial supervision. At the same time, the extent to which central banks 
should use tools at their disposal to play a pro-active sustainable development role to 
promote green investment and dis-incentivise dirty investments is still heavily 
disputed, and there are indeed concerns that promoting specific sectors such as the 
green economy may cause conflict with other central bank goals, including financial 
stability. 
Second, there is a danger that too much power may be extended to institutions with 
limited accountability to the public. Since the 1980s, a relatively broad consensus has 
developed that central banks should be granted institutional independence, i.e., the 
conduct of monetary policy in pursuit of goals set by the government should be free 
from political influence. As central bank policies have adopted unconventional 
monetary policies in the post 2008-Crisis era, they have faced increased criticism for 
taking policy decisions that critics say go beyond their mandate (e.g., Tucker 2018). 
For example, a quasi-fiscal role of central banks is widely considered problematic as 
central banks have no political legitimacy for taking decisions about the allocation of 
public spending. Still, it is important to recognise that monetary policy has always had 
distributional consequences and that central banking cannot be reduced to a purely 
technical exercise. One way of addressing this issue is by improving central bank 
accountability, by enhancing reporting requirements for instance. 
Central banks need to create the legitimacy of their actions through clearly 
communicating their assessment of the risks and the rationale for their policy actions. 
Otherwise, they may be at risk of losing their independence (Eichengreen et al. 2011). 
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As highlighted by Groepe (2016: 1), “the biggest risk to central bank independence is 
the possible backlash from being unable to deliver on unreasonable expectations. 
Central bank mandates have expanded – perhaps appropriately so – but there are 
limits to what monetary policy was designed to achieve. Central banks cannot be, and 
should not be regarded as, “the only game in town”.” Indeed, there is a danger that 
“governments, parliaments, public authorities, and the private sector assume central 
bank policies can substitute for the structural and other policies they should take 
themselves” (G30 2015: xii). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our empirical investigation has shown how central bank mandates relate to green 
activities of supporting sustainable growth, mainstreaming green finance or 
incorporating climate-related risks into core policy implementation frameworks. We 
show that, on the one hand, 52% of the 135 investigated central banks and monetary 
unions are already mandated to either explicitly contribute to the sustainability of 
growth and development or to support the government’s economic policies, which 
would usually include sustainability objectives. ESG criteria would not have to be 
added to the mandates of these institutions. On the other hand, 48% of central banks 
have no explicit or implicit sustainability objectives. However, many of them have 
nonetheless begun to engage in various green activities. Most of these activities aim 
at incorporating environmental and climate change-related risks into the core policy 
implementation frameworks under the objectives of price and financial stability. As we 
show, climate risks can very directly impact on traditional core responsibilities of 
central banks, most notably monetary and financial stability. As a consequence, an 
integration of ESG factors into central banks’ core policy implementation frameworks 
may not only be necessary to efficiently and successfully safeguard price and financial 
stability, it would be also covered by mandates that make no explicit or implicit 
reference to sustainability. A potential role of central banks in promoting sustainability 
in the financial system and “greening” the economy, however, is more contentious 
because of the possible distorting effects of such policies. It therefore is crucial that 
such a potential promotional role of the central bank is covered by the mandate. 
While central banks have a potentially large number of instruments to affect the 
allocation of capital towards green investment, this does not imply that they should 
necessarily be tasked to do everything they possibly could. Starting with existing 
central bank mandates – which differ across countries/monetary areas – and also 
taking into consideration different central banking traditions, a discussion is needed 
about the extent to which and the way how central banks should support their 
respective government’s sustainability policies. The outcomes of such deliberations 
will inevitably differ across countries and will also be contingent on institutional 
legacies (Johnson 2001; North 1990). The path-dependent nature of institutional 
change, which also is affected by established cultural patterns, requires that 
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institutional traditions are considered so that resistance to change does not undermine 
attempts at institutional redesign. 
The ways in which central banks will address the climate emergency will inevitably 
differ. The extent to which a central bank adopts a more activist approach to support 
a government’s sustainability objectives is ultimately a political decision. Nevertheless, 
it should be clear that climate change and mitigation policies will have very profound 
impacts on economies, with potentially significant implications for macroeconomic and 
financial stability. These need to be tackled by central banks as part of their core 
responsibilities. A central bank that does not address climate risk is failing to do its job. 
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Sustainability objective “Green” central banking activities 
Austria 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union” 
2018: Oesterreichische Nationalbank becomes a NGFS member 
Belgium 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union” 
2018: Nationale Bank van België (NBB) becomes a NGFS member 






“(c) thirdly, to assist insofar as it is not inconsistent with the 
objectives as set out in paragraphs (a) and (b), in the attainment of 
national economic development goals.” 
 





“I. adapt the money supply to the real needs of the national 
economy and its development process;” 
2011: Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) Resolution 3,988 
incorporates risk of exposure to environmental damages into 
“Internal Process of Capital Adequacy Assessment” (ICAAP) 
requirements 
2012: BCB becomes a SBN member 
2014: BCB issues Guidelines on “Social and Environmental 
Responsibility for Financial Institutions” and discusses and defines 
E&S risk exposure; Brazilian Monetary Council (CMN) issues 
resolution on Financial Institution’s Socio-Environmental 
Responsibility 
2018: CMN requires asset managers to consider (ESG) Risks 
2019: CMN requires Pension Funds to state whether they consider 
E&S issues in investment decisions 
Bulgaria 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor (Euro) 
“Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
 
Cambodia Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor (US 
dollar) 
“The principle mission of the Central Bank is to determine and 
direct the monetary policy aimed at maintaining price stability in 
order to facilitate economic development within the framework of 
the Kingdom’s economic and financial policy.” 
2016: National Bank of Cambodia, the Association of Banks in 
Cambodia (ABC) and the Ministry of Environment launch the 
Cambodian Sustainable Finance Initiative 
2019: National Bank of Cambodia endorses Sustainable Finance 




Price stability Monetary 
aggregate target 
“Without detriment to the principal objective of general price 





Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor (Euro) 
“Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 




Price stability Other (EMU) “(2) Without prejudice to this primary objective and subject to the 
fulfilment of its obligations under Article 105 paragraph (1) of the 
Treaty, the Bank shall support the general economic policy of 
the State.” 
 




Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“Without prejudice to its primary objective, the Czech National Bank 
shall support the general economic policies of the Government 
leading to sustainable economic growth and the general 
economic policies in the European Union with a view to contributing 




Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor (Euro) 
“Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union 
as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
2019: Danmarks Nationalbank becomes a NGFS member 
Egypt Price stability Other “The Central Bank shall work on realizing price stability and 
banking system soundness, within the context of the general 
economic policy of the State.” 
2019: Central Bank of Egypt becomes a SBN member 
Estonia 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Other (EMU) “(1) The primary aim of the Bank of Estonia is to maintain price 
stability. The Bank of Estonia also supports the achievement of 
other economic policy objectives in accordance with the Treaty 




Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
2018: ECB becomes a NGFS member 
Fiji Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor 
(composite) 
“(a) to protect the value of the currency in the interest of balanced 
and sustainable economic growth;” 
2012: Reserve Bank of Fiji establishes Agriculture and Renewable 
Energy Loans Ratio, requiring banks to allocate 2 percent of 
deposits to the renewable energy sector 
2017: Reserve Bank of Fiji becomes a SBN member 
Finland 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective laid down in paragraph 1, the 
Bank of Finland shall also support the achievement of other 
economic policy objectives in accordance with the Treaty.” 
2018: Bank of Finland introduces responsible investment standards 




Price stability  Other (EMU) “Within this framework, and without prejudice to the primary 
objective of price stability, the Banque de France shall contribute to 
the government's general economic policy.” 
2017: Banque de France launches NGFS 
2018: Banque de France investigates the extra-financial 
performance of its portfolios and applies Responsible Investment 
Charter to the management of its assets 
2019: Banque de France publishes Financial Stability Review on 
the subject of Greening the Financial System 
Gambia, the Price stability Monetary 
aggregate target 
“(d) encourage and promote sustainable economic development 
and the efficient utilisation of the resources of The Gambia through 
the effective and efficient operation of a financial system.” 
 
Georgia Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“2. The National Bank shall ensure stability and transparency of the 
financial system and facilitate sustainable economic growth in 
the country, if this is possible without posing a threat to attaining its 
main objective.” 
2017: National Bank of Georgia becomes a SBN member 
Germany 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union” 
2017: Deutsche Bundesbank becomes a founding member of 
NGFS 
Ghana Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) the Bank shall support the 
general economic policy of the Government and promote 
economic growth and effective and efficient operation of banking 
2016: Bank of Ghana becomes a SBN member 
2019: Bank of Ghana launches the Ghana Sustainable Banking 
Principles 
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and credit systems in the country, independent of instructions from 
the Government or any other authority.” 
Greece 
(ESCB) 
Price stability  Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to this primary objective, the Bank shall support 
the general economic policy of the government.” 
2019: Bank of Greece becomes a NGFS member 
Hungary 
(ESCB) 
Price stability  Inflation targeting 
framework 
“(2) Without prejudice to its primary objective, the MNB shall 
support the maintenance of the stability of the financial 
intermediary system, the enhancement of its resilience, its 
sustainable contribution to economic growth; furthermore, the 
MNB shall support the economic policy of the government using 
the instruments at its disposal.” 
2019: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) becomes a NGFS member, 
launches green preferential capital requirement programme and 
recommends requiring all credit institutions to have an 
environmental risk management system 
Iceland Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“The Central Bank shall promote the implementation of the 
Government’s economic policy as long as it does not consider 
this inconsistent with its main objective as described in Paragraph 
1 above.” 
 
Indonesia  Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“(2) To achieve the goal referred to in paragraph (1), Bank 
Indonesia shall conduct monetary policy on a sustained, consistent, 
and transparent basis, taking into account the general 
economic policies of the government.” 
1998: Bank Indonesia introduces regulation to require banks to 
conduct environmental impact assessments for large or high risks 
loans 
2005: Bank Indonesia issues regulation requiring commercial 
banks to include environmental measures in assessments of 
business prospects 
2012: Bank Indonesia issues Green Lending Model Guidelines for 
Mini Hydro Power Plant Projects 
2014: Bank Indonesia develops voluntary Green Lending Model 
Guidelines for Mini Hydro Power Plant Projects for banks 
2019: Bank Indonesia becomes a NGFS member 









“The primary objectives of the CBI shall be to achieve and maintain 
domestic price stability and to foster and maintain a stable and 
competitive market-based financial system. Subject to these 
objectives, the CBI shall also promote sustainable growth, 
employment, and prosperity in Iraq.” 
2019: Central Bank of Iraq becomes a SBN member 
Ireland 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European 
Union” 
2019: Central Bank of Ireland becomes a NGFS member 
Israel Price stability  Inflation targeting 
framework 
“(2) to support other objectives of the Government’s economic 
policy, especially growth, employment and reducing social gaps, 
provided that, in the Committee’s opinion, this support shall not 
prejudice the attainment of Price Stability over the Course of Time” 
 
Italy (ESCB) Price stability Other (EMU) “the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the 
Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union” 
2019: Banca d’Italia becomes a NGFS member 
Kenya Price stability Other “(3) Subject to subsections (1) and (2), the Bank shall support the 
economic policy of the Government, including its objectives for 
growth and employment. No. 9 of 2007” 
2015: Central Bank of Kenya and Kenyan Banking Association 
adopt Sustainable Finance Guiding Principles 
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2017: Central Bank of Kenya (with Kenya Bankers Association, 










“3. Without prejudice to attainment of these two objectives, the 





Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
“Without prejudice to the primary objective, the Bank of Latvia shall 
support the general economic policies in the European Union in 
accordance with Article 127(1) of the Treaty” 
 
Liberia Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor (US 
dollar) 
“c. encourage and mobilization of domestic and foreign savings 
and their efficient allocation for productive economic activities; 
[…] e. foster monetary, credit and financial conditions conducive to 





Price stability Other (EMU) “[…] support the economic policy carried out by the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania, without prejudice to the 
primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania and to the extent this 
meets the objectives of the European Central Bank and of the 
European System of Central Banks.” 
2017: Bank of Lithuania initiates amendments to Law on 




Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union” 





Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor (Euro) 
“(3) The National Bank shall support the general economic 
policies without endangering the achievement of the objective set 
forth in paragraph (1) of this Article and in conformity with the 
principle of open market economy and free competition.” 
 
Madagascar Price stability Monetary 
aggregate target 
“To that end, the central bank shall be fully independent to develop 
and implement monetary policy. It shall carry out its mission in 
respect of credit policy within the framework of the 
government’s general economic policy.” 
 








“(2) In pursuing, or in performing any functions in the pursuit of, its 
principal objectives, the Bank shall act with due regard to the 







Other “(1) The principal objects of the Bank shall be to promote monetary 
stability and financial stability conducive to the sustainable 
growth of the Malaysian economy.” 
2010: Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) develops a Green Technology 
Financing Scheme to promote investment in the green technology 
industry in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, the Credit 
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Guarantee Corporation and the Ministry of Energy, Green 
Technology and Water. 
2012: BNM hosts a Green Technology Financing Conference 
2017: BNM creates a Technical Working Group on Green Finance, 
leading to issuance of first green Islamic bond 
2018: BNM becomes a NGFS member and launches Value-Based 
Intermediation (VBI) Financing and Investment Impact Assessment 
Framework 
Malta (ESCB) Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union” 
2019: Central Bank of Malta becomes a NGFS member 
Mauritania Price stability Other “In addition, and without prejudice to the objective of price stability, 
the Bank shall strive to ensure the stability of the financial system 
and shall contribute to the implementation of the general 
economic policies defined by the government.” 
 
Moldova Price stability  Inflation targeting 
framework 
“(2) Without prejudice to the primary objective, the National Bank 
shall foster and maintain a stable market-based financial system 








“The Central Bank shall, without prejudice to pursuing its 
objectives, support the pursuing of economic policy of the 
Government of Montenegro (hereinafter: the Government), acting 
thereby in accordance with the principles of free and open market 




Price stability  Exchange rate 
anchor 
(composite) 
“Without prejudice to the price stability objective established in 
coordination with the Minister of Finance, the Bank performs its 
functions in the framework of the government’s economic and 
financial policy.” 
2014: Bank Al-Maghrib becomes a SBN member 
2018: Bank Al-Maghrib becomes a NGFS member 
2019: Bank Al-Maghrib becomes a TCFD supporter and publishes 
‘Roadmap for Aligning the Moroccan Financial Sector with 
Sustainable Development’ 
Myanmar Price stability Monetary 
aggregate target 
“The Central Bank shall, in accordance with its aim, also endeavor 
to attain the following objectives: […] (d) to support the general 










“(e) to assist in the attainment of national economic goals.”  
Nepal Price stability,  Exchange rate 
anchor (other) 
“(1) The objectives of the Bank shall be as follows: (a) To formulate 
necessary monetary and foreign exchange policies in order to 
maintain the stability of price and balance of payment for 
sustainable development of economy, and manage it; […] (2) 
The Bank shall, without any prejudice to the objectives referred to 
in subsection (1), extend co-operation in the implementation of 
the economic policies of Government of Nepal.” 
2014: Nepal Rastra Bank becomes a SBN member 
2018: Nepal Rastra Bank issues ‘Guideline of E&S Risk 
Management for Banks and Financial Institutions’ 
Netherlands 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
2014: De Nederlandsche Bank’s (DNB) mandate is updated to 
include “sustainable prosperity” and “financial stability,” as well as 
equipping the DNB with new macro-prudential instruments and 
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to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
tools to fulfil the task, and publishes a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for 2019-2025 
2016: DNB publishes an exploratory study on the transition to a 
carbon-neutral economy and establishes the Sustainable Finance 
Platform 
2017: DNB becomes a TCFD supporter, founding member of the 
NGFS and publishes an Assessment of Climate-Related Risks for 
the Dutch Financial Sector 
2018: DNB organizes International Climate Risk Conference for 
Supervisors and becomes first central bank to sign up to the UN’s 
Principles for Responsible Investment  






“A State Central Bank, which will be a technical organization, is 
hereby established. It will be exclusively charged with issuing 
currency and, in accordance with the objectives of the national 
government’ economic policy, will participate with other State 
technical organizations in formulating monetary, credit, and foreign 
currency exchange policies” 
2016: Banco Central del Paraguay becomes a SBN member 
Philippines Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“The primary objective of the Bangko Sentral is to maintain price 
stability conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the 
economy. It shall also promote and maintain monetary stability 
and the convertibility of the peso.” 
2013: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas becomes a SNB member  
Poland 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“1. The basic objective of the activity of the NBP shall be to 
maintain price stability, while supporting the economic policy of 
the Government, insofar as this does not constrain the pursuit of 




Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union” 
2018: Banco de Portugal becomes a NGFS member 
Qatar State policy, 
Exchange 




“The Bank shall act to implement the general economic and 
developmental policy of the State in a way which does not 
contradict the following objectives: […]” 
2018: Qatar Central Bank cooperates with Qatar Development 
Bank to promote sustainable investment 
Romania 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 




Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“The principal objective of the Bank of Russia's monetary policy 
shall be to protect and ensure stability of the rouble by way of 
maintaining price stability, including for the creation of conditions 
for balanced and sustainable economic development.” 
2011: Bank of Russia issues Regulation on Information Disclosure, 
including use of energy resources, risk factors, corporate 
governance and remuneration, and compliance with the Russian 
Code of Corporate Governance 
2014: Bank of Russia issues Code of Corporate Governance that 
requires assessment of ESG risk 
2016: Bank of Russia reviews financial market regulation, including 
provisions on green bonds 
2019: Bank of Russia becomes a NGFS member 





“c. providing adequate support to the financial system of the 
Republic, to include performing the functions of incentive and 
guidance;” 
 




Republic of  
Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“Without prejudice to its objectives referred to in paragraphs 1 and 
2 of this Article, the National Bank of Serbia shall support the 
pursuance of economic policy of the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia (hereinafter: the Government), operating in 





Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor 
(composite) 
“The principal objects of the Authority shall be — (a) to maintain 
price stability conducive to sustainable growth of the economy” 
2012: Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issues Code of 
Corporate Governance including Sustainability Issues 
2015: MAS supports Singapore Stewardship Principles for 
Responsible Investors 
2016: MAS becomes founding member of the Sustainable 
Insurance Forum 
2017: MAS launches Green Bond Grant Scheme, becomes 
founding member of the NGFS and a TCFD supporter 
2019: MAS launches Singapore’s Green Finance Action Plan, 




Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
2019: Národná banka Slovenska becomes a NGFS member 
Slovenia 
(ESCB) 
Price stability Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
 
South Africa Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“The primary objective of the Bank shall be to protect the value of 
the currency of the Republic in the interest of balanced and 
sustainable economic growth in the Republic” 
2019: The South African Reserve Bank becomes a NGFS member 
Spain 
(ESCB) 
Price stability  Other (EMU) “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
2018: Banco de España becomes a NGFS member 
Sweden 
(ESCB) 
 Inflation targeting 
framework 
“Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support 
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” “The 
objective of the Riksbank’s activities shall be to maintain price 
stability. The Riksbank shall also promote a safe and efficient 
payments system.” 
2018: Sveriges Riksbank becomes a NGFS member 
Switzerland  Interest of the 
country, price 
stability 
Other “1. The National Bank shall pursue a monetary policy serving the 
interests of the country as a whole. It shall ensure price stability. 
In so doing, it shall take due account of the development of the 
economy.” 
2016: Swiss National Bank issues Annual Environmental Report, 
explaining its strategy in connection with climate change 
2019: Swiss National Bank becomes a NGFS member 
Tanzania Price stability Monetary 
aggregate target  
“(1) The primary objective of the Bank shall be to formulate, define 
and implement monetary policy directed to the economic objective 
of maintaining domestic price stability conducive to a balanced 
and sustainable growth of the national economy. (2) Without 
prejudice to subsection (1), the Bank shall ensure the integrity of 
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the financial system and support the general economic policy of 
the Government and promote sound monetary, credit and banking 
conditions conducive to the development of the national economy.” 
Turkey Price stability Inflation targeting 
framework 
“The Bank shall, provided that it shall not conflict with the objective 
of maintaining price stability, support the growth and 






“The National Bank shall also promote sustainability of the 
economic growth and second the economic policy of the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine provided that it does not prevent 
the NBU from attainment of the objectives determined in the 










“(a) to maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support 
the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its 
objectives for growth and employment.” 
2015: Bank of England (BoE) Governor Mark Carney highlights the 
Bank’s view on climate change 
2016: BoE publishes research on climate change and central 
banks and organizes workshops and conferences on the subject 
on climate risks and financial stability; co-chairs the G20 Green 
Finance Study Group (renamed in G20 Sustainable Finance Study 
Group in 2018) 
2017: BoE becomes founding member of the NGFS 
2018: BoE reviews impact of climate change on the UK banking 
sector 
2019: Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority (BoE PRA) 
conducts General Insurance Stress Tests (GIST) to assess the 
impact of climate change, publishes Framework for Assessing 
Financial Impacts of Physical Climate Change and issues 
Supervisory Statement (SS3/19) on Enhancing Banks’ and 
Insurers’ Approaches to Managing the Financial Risks from 
Climate Change 
2020: BoE will disclose how financial risks from climate change are 





Price stability Exchange rate 
anchor (Euro) 
“Without prejudice to this objective, the Central Bank shall lend its 
support to the economic policies of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), with a view to achieving sound and 
sustainable growth.” 
 






“(b) To protect the currency of Zimbabwe in the interest of 
balanced and sustainable economic growth;” 
 
Source: Compiled with data from the IMF Central Bank Legislation Database, IMF (2018), Volz (2019), Dikau and Volz (2019) and central bank reports and 
websites. 
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Table 2: Central Banks Engaged in “Green” Activities and their Core Objectives 










2018: Reserve Bank of Australia becomes 
a NGFS member 
2019: Reserve Bank of Australia 
discusses incorporating climate models in 
economic modelling 
“a) the stability of the currency of 
Australia; b) the maintenance of full 
employment in Australia; c) and the 
economic prosperity and welfare of the 




2009: Bangladesh Bank (BB) introduces 
green refinancing lines 
2011: BB issues Policy Guidelines on 
Green Banking 
2012: BB becomes a SNB member 
2016: BB launches its Green 
Transformation Fund and issues green 
portfolio ceilings at 5% and Integrated 
Risk Management Guidelines for Financial 
Institutions and Banks 
2017: BB issues Guidelines on 
Environmental & Social Risk Management 
for Banks and Financial Institutions 
2019: BB expands Green Transformation 
Fund (GTF) from just three sectors to 
include all manufacturing and export-
oriented entities 
Price stability, “towards fostering growth 
and development of country’s productive 




2019: Bank of Canada becomes NGFS 
member and launches research initiative 
on climate-related risks 
“to promote the economic and financial 








2007: People’s Bank of China (PBOC), 
China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) and Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) launch Green Credit 
Policy (“Opinions on Enforcing Policies 
and Regulations on Environmental 
Protection to Prevent Credit Risk”) 
2015: PBOC publishes notice on Green 
Financial Bonds in China’s Inter-Bank 
Bond Market and together with the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) issues guidelines defining criteria 
and category for green bond projects 
2016: PBOC issues Guidelines for 
Establishing the Green Financial System 
and co-chairs the G20 Green Finance 
Study Group (renamed in G20 
Sustainable Finance Study Group in 2018) 
2017: PBOC becomes a founding member 
of NGFS, incorporates green finance into 
the macro-prudential assessment system, 
including through positive incentives for 
commercial banks to increase their stock 
of green credit and boost green deposits 
to supplement green credit and PBOC and 
other ministries and commissions jointly 
issue a Financial Industry Standardisation 
System Construction Development Plan 
(2016–2020), including “green financial 
standardization” with a focus on product 
standards, information disclosure 
standards and green credit rating 
standards for financial institutions 
2018: PBOC accepts green loans with AA 
rating as collateral in the medium-term 
loan facility, issues a trial Green credit 
performance evaluation plan for banking 
deposit financial institutions, further 
refining the evaluation criteria for the 
green credit performance of banking 
financial institutions, starts accepting 
green loans with AA rating as collateral in 
the medium-term loan facility and together 
Price stability “and thereby promote 
economic growth.” 
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with the CSRC jointly issues China’s 




2019: Banco de la República becomes a 
NGFS member 
Price stability (El Congreso de Colombia, 
1993) 
Costa Rica Inflation 
targeting 
framework 
2019: Central Bank of Costa Rica 
becomes a NGFS member 
Price stability, promote orderly 
developments (Ley Orgánica del Banco 








2019: Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) becomes a NGFS member, 
TCFD supporter and establishes the 
Centre for Green Finance (GCF) under its 
Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office, 
announces Green Finance Development 
measures and supports green bond 
issuance 




2015: Reserve Bank of India introduces 
Priority Sector Lending – Targets and 
Classification 
2019: Reserve Bank of India revises 
guidelines for its Priority Sectors Lending 
programme, includes Renewable Energy 
“maintain price stability while keeping in 




2019: Bank of Japan becomes a NGFS 
member 
“achieving price stability, thereby 
contributing to the sound development of 




2016: Central Bank of Jordan becomes a 
SBN member 
“The objectives of the Central Bank shall 
be to maintain monetary stability in the 
Kingdom and to ensure the convertibility 
of the Jordan Dinar, and to promote the 
sustained economic growth in the 
Kingdom in accordance with the general 






2019: Bank of Korea becomes a NGFS 
member 
“(1) The monetary and credit policies of 
the Bank of Korea shall be carried out in 
harmony with the economic policy of 
the Government insofar as this does not 
impeding the price stabilization.” 
Lao P.D.R. Other 2012: Bank of Lao becomes a SBN 
member 
“maintaining stability of the value of Kip 
and contributing to the growth and 
efficiency of the socio-economic 




 “safeguarding the national currency in 
order to ensure the basis for sustained 
social and economic growth. This mission 
consists of: •Safeguard of monetary and 
economic stability •Safeguard of the 
soundness of the banking sector 





2001: Banque du Liban (BDL) publishes 
Circular No 81, introducing differentiated 
reserve requirements, favouring loans tied 
to energy saving plans 
2010: BDL issues circular to promote 
Financing for Green Sectors 
2013: BDL issues Circular 313 to 
incentivise eco-friendly investment 
2014: BDL establishes Subsidized Loan 
Scheme to Green Sectors  
“Maintain price stability thru vigilant 
conduct of monetary policy, which 
generally targets low and stable inflation 
rates to preserve the purchasing power of 
the Dinar. Being a banker and adviser to 
the Government, playing a dynamic role in 
advising on macroeconomic policies. The 
Central Bank of Libya  is the sole authority 
in issuing currency as well as managing 
the country’s international reserves. 
Promote financial sector stability through 
the progressive development of 
sustainable, robust and sound financial 





2017: Banco de México becomes 
founding member of the NGFS 
Price stability, “thereby strengthening the 
State’s guidance of national development” 
Mongolia Other 2012: Bank of Mongolia becomes a SBN 
member 
2014: Bank of Mongolia issues Mongolia 
Sustainable Finance Principles and Sector 
Guidelines (with Mongolia Banking 
Association) 
Price stability, “maintain[ing] the stability of 
financial market and banking system to 
support balanced development of national 
economy” 




2012: Central Bank of Nigeria becomes a 
SBN member and together with the 
Nigerian Banking Association adopts 
Sustainable Banking Principles 
“Monetary and price stability”, financial 





2018: Norges Bank becomes a NGFS 
member 
“The Bank shall be an executive and 
advisory body for monetary, credit and 
foreign exchange policy. It shall issue 
banknotes and coin, promote an efficient 
payment system domestically as well as 
vis-à-vis other countries and monitor 
developments in the money, credit and 
foreign exchange markets.” 
New Zealand Inflation 
targeting 
framework 
2018: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
becomes a NGFS member 
2019: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
reviews Reserve Bank Act to consider 
how climate risks could affect financial 
stability 
“formulating and implementing monetary 
policy designed to promote stability in the 
general level of prices, while recognising 
the Crown’s right to deter- mine economic 
policy” 
Pakistan Other 2015: State Bank of Pakistan becomes a 
SBN member 
2017: State Bank of Pakistan issues the 
Green Banking Guidelines, outlining 
Environmental Risk Management 
Guidelines 
“regulate the monetary and credit system 
of Pakistan and to foster its growth in the 
best national interest with a view to 
securing monetary stability and fuller 
utilisation of the country’s productive 
resources” 
Samoa Other 2019: Central Bank of Samoa becomes a 
SBN member 
“[…] promoting internal and external 
monetary stability; promoting a sound 
financial structure; promote credit and 
exchange conditions conducive to the 
orderly and balanced economic 
development of Samoa; […]” (website, 
Central Bank of Samoa Act 1984) 
Sri Lanka Other 2016: Central Bank of Sri Lanka becomes 
a SBN member 
“(a) economic and price stability; and (b) 
financial system stability, with a view to 
encouraging and promoting the 
development of the productive resources 




2019: Bank of Thailand becomes a NGFS 
member and launches Guidelines for 
Responsible Lending Institutions 
“(The BOT’s objectives are to carry on 
such tasks as pertain to central banking in 
order to maintain monetary stability, 
financial institution system stability and 
payment systems stability”, “To undertake 
the tasks in paragraph one, the 
implementation of economic policy of the 
government shall be taken into 
consideration.” 
Tunisia Other 2019: Banque Centrale de Tunisie 
becomes a NGFS and a SBN member 
“The general mission of the Central Bank 
is safeguard price stability. In this regard, 
it is responsible for: - monitoring monetary 
policy; - controlling currency in circulation 
and ensuring the proper functioning of 
payment systems; - supervising lending 
establishments; and - preserving the 





2012: State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) 
becomes a SBN member 
2015: SBV issues directive on Promoting 
Green Credit Growth and Managing 
Environmental and Social Risks in Credit 
Extension SBV: Action Plan of Banking 
Sector to Implement the National Green 
Growth Strategy until 2020 
2016: SBV issues circular on ESG factors, 
requiring lending to take environmental 
protection into account 
2017: SBV renews commitment to 
implementing the Green Growth Program 
and the Program of Preventing Climate 
Change 
“3. The State Bank performs the state 
management of monetary, banking and 
foreign exchange (below referred to as 
monetary and banking) operations and 
performs the function of a central bank in 
issuing money, a bank of credit institutions 
and a provider of monetary services for 
the Government.” 
Source: Compiled by authors, drawing on Volz (2019), Dikau and Volz (2019), IMF (2018), central 
bank websites and central bank acts (directly referenced). 
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Figure 1: Central Banks with and without “Sustainability” Mandates 
 
Note: Out of a total of 135 investigated central banks. 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
 
Figure 2: Explicit and Potential Sustainability Objectives 
 
Note: Out of the 70 central banks with a ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ sustainability mandate. 
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Figure 3: Number of Central Banks that Have Adopted “Green” Activities (by 
Type) 
 
Note: All data included in Tables 1 and 2. 









2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Green/sustainable network membership
Incorporation of ESG criteria in central bank portfolio management / TCFD supporter
Integration of climate risk into macroprudential policy (implemented or under development)
Guidelines on environmental risk management, disclosure requirements or stress tests for financial
institutions
Green bond support programmes
Green lending guidelines/guidance or "promotional/directed" credit policies for financial institutions
